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ST/\TEMENT OF THE CASE 
1<ature Of The Case 
~,fark Boncz appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas 
A grand jury indicted Boncz on one count of lewd conduct with a child under the 
age of sixteen. (R., p.129.) After a bench trial, the district court found that Boncz was 
guilty of the crime. (R., pp.108, 129.) On March 12, 2010, the district court entered 
judgment against Boncz and sentenced him to a unified term of life imprisonment with 
15 years fixed. (R., pp.108, 129-30.) Banez did not file an appeal from the judgment. 1 
The judgment, therefore, became final on April 23, 2010. 
Almost two years later, in February 2012, Boncz filed his petition for post-
conviction relief. 2 (R., pp.15-25.) Six months later, in August, he filed an amended 
petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
resulting in an illegal indictment and lack of a thorough defense. (R., pp.68-71.) The 
state filed a motion for summary dismissal on the basis that Banez had failed to make a 
prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.75-81.) 
1 While Boncz did file a Rule 35 motion and appeal from the district court's subsequent 
denial of that motion, that appeal cannot serve as an appeal from the judgment. State 
v. Mosqueda, 123 Idaho 858, 859, 853 P.2d 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1993). 
2 Clearly Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief was not timely. See LC. § 19-4902 
("An application may be flied at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the 
time for appeal. ... "). However, as the statute of limitations issue was not discussed 
below, the state will not address it further in this appeal. 
1 
L.ater, Boncz filed a second amended petition for post-conviction reiief, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel and a deprivation of his "5th, 6th, and 14th 
Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law," both on the identical g;-ounds 
that 'counsel should have hired an expert on my behalf, and I should have been 
permitted to testify." (R., pp.107-09.) The state renewed its motion for summary 
dismissal. (R., p.115.) 
The district court held a hearing on the state's motion. (R., pp.127-28; see also 
Tr.) At the hearing, Boncz's counsel clarified that they were withdrawing the claims 
relating to the grand jury and focusing on Boncz's not being able to testify. (Tr., p.11, 
L.15 - p.12, L.22.) The district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately 
granted the state's motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.129-36), and dismissed 
Boncz's petition (R., p.159). Banez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.140-42.) 
2 
iSSUF 
Boncz states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district 1:ourt err when it concluded, against the 
uncontradicted evidence, that summary dismissal was appropriate as to 
the c!aims that Mr. Boncz was deprived of his constitutionai right to testify 
at trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
did not permit him to testify? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Boncz failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Banez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summar· Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
!n his second amended post-conviction petition, Boncz asserted that he was 
entitled to relief because, he argued, his attorney "should have hired an expert on [his] 
behalf, and [he] should have been permitted to testify." (R., pp.107-09.) The district 
court summarily dismissed those claims. (R., pp.129-36.) Boncz asserts that the 
district court erred by dismissing his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
14.) However, application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows 
that summary dismissal was proper. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Banez Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
4 
idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction reiief. Pizzuto v.:.. 
Howeve,, unlike other civii 
comp!aints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under i.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." ~ (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion. "To withstand summary dismissal, 
a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to 
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State 
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 
581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" 
as to each element of the petitioner's claims. V\/orkman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 
802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a 
court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. \Norkman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
5 
at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State. 135 idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110. 112 (2001 )). 
"Aiiegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law." Id. 
Articulating and applying relevant legal standards, the district court addressed 
and dismissed the claims and assertions contained in Boncz's second amended petition 
for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit. The state adopts as part of its 
argument on appeal the district court's detailed legal analysis, found at pages 4-8 of its 
"Opinion and Order on State's Motions for Summary Disposition,!! a copy of which is 
attached as "Appendix A." 
On appeal, Boncz does not challenge the dismissal of his claim that his attorney 
should have hired an expert. (Appellant's brief, p.9, n.7.) Because Banez does not 
challenge the dismissal of this claim on appeal, the district court's order regarding this 
claim should be affirmed. Instead, Banez confines his arguments on appeal to his claim 
that he "should have been permitted to testify." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) Primarily, 
he argues that the district court "failed to perceive Mr. Boncz's claim that he was 
deprived of his constitutional right to testify as separate and distinct from his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his attorney's refusal to call him to 
testify." (Id., p.5.) He also asserts that he made the necessary showing of prejudice to 
survive summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id., pp.10-
14.) Both arguments fail. 
The failure of a defendant to testify may be examined in post-conviction either as 
a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right, or as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
6 
coc;nsel. Rossignol v. State. 152 1daho 700, 706, 274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 20, 2) 
(citations omitted). \Nhere the issue 1s viewed as a dep,ivation of a constitutional right, 
the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he was deprived of a constitutional 
right and the state bears the burden of showing that the deprivation was harmless. Id. 
at 704, 27 4 P.3d at 5 (citing State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522, 708 P.2d 921, 927 (Ct. 
App. 1985). Where the issue is viewed as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it 
is analyzed under the Strickland3 standard, requiring the defendant to identify both his 
counsel's deficient performance and resultant prejudice . .kl 
Contrary to Boncz's arguments, the district court did recognize that Banez was 
attempting to raise his "should have been permitted to testify" claim both as an assertion 
that he was deprived of a constitutional right and as an assertion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (See R., p.132.) The district court first addressed Boncz's claim 
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify and found that it was 
unsupported by the record. (R., p.133.) At sentencing, when given the opportunity to 
allocute, Boncz "went on at some length" informing "the trial judge of the many errors he 
believed were committed by his trial counsel." (Id.) Banez never claimed, however, that 
he was prevented from testifying. (Id.) Because there was no evidence supporting 
Boncz's claim that he was deprived of the right to testify, the district court correctly 
dismissed that claim. 
Even if the district court had failed to distinguish the two claims, that would not 
impact the ultimate outcome in this case. The only re!evant difference between the two 
standards is, assuming that Banez had shown an affirmative deprivation of his right to 
3 Strickland v. VVashington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
7 
testify (which he did not), the state 1,,vouid have the bcJrden of establishing the absence 
of p:eJudice. But in this case the district court did not merely find that Boncz had failed 
to show prejudice: it found that there was no prejudice. (R., pp.133-34.) 
Boncz asserts that he made a prima facie showing of prejudice because he 
claimed in his affidavit that, in addition to denying that he committed the crime, he wouid 
have disputed irrelevant facts, such as the location of his bed in relation to his trailer. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13; R., pp.102-03.) Banez would not, however, have offered any 
exonerating testimony. (R., pp.133-34.) Because Banez received a bench trial, the 
district court was in the unique position of being able to say with certainty whether 
Boncz's proffered testimony would have affected the verdict. The court determined that, 
even had he testified, nothing in Boncz's affidavit would have changed the outcome of 
this case. (R., p.136.) Therefore, there was no prejudice. 
The district court correctly dismissed Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief 
because Banez failed to show that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify at 
his bench trial and because, assuming deficient performance, Banez was not prejudiced 
by not testifying at his bench trial. The district court's order summarily dismissing 
Boncz's untimely petition for post-conviction relief should be affirmed. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The state respe:::;tfuliy requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
surnmariiy dismissing Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2014. 
R .SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of September, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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CASE NO, CV12--00297 
OPINION ,A,.ND ORDER 
ON STATE'S MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSIDON 
This matter is before the Court on 1he State of Idaho's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Matk Boncz• s Second Amended J?etitlon for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court. having read the 
Petitio11t affidavit, bt.efs of the parties, having reviewed transcripts of the grand jury proceedblg, 
the court trial, and sentencing, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
Mark Boncz was indicted by a grand jury on one collllt of lewd conduct with a minor 
under~ years of age in violation of LC. § l 8w508. A comt trlal was held in the matter and, 
after hearing testimony from~ Boncz was found guilty of the charge. On Maroh 12, 
2010, Bon.oz was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a unified 
Bo"fll»;11.$lt:!¥1J 
Opinion. & Order Oil Motion tbr SUmmury ~ 
Oi29 
life sentence, with a fixed period of incercenttion of not less than :fifteen (15'; vears. O.u }wy 6 ' ., , 
2010. Boncz filed a Motion for Reduction of sentence, which was denied by the trial court on 
July 27, 2010. Boncz filed an appeal of1he denial of bis Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of 
Sentence. However, his sentence was affirmed in~ t:mpublished opinion entered September 71 
2011 by 1he Idaho Court of Appeals. Boncz then filed the above-entitled Petition for Post-
Conviction Re~ an Amended Petition for Post.conviction Relief, and a Second .Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Reliet: The State subsequently filed a Motion fur Summary 
Dismissal. 
'.POST-CONVICfiON RltJJEF STANDARD 
seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the 
United Sta:tes or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) ThB1 the court was without jurisdiction to impose semence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum a.uthoriud by law; 
(4) T.batthere exis1S evidence ofmatetial facts, not previously presented end 
beard; tba:t requires vacation of the conviction or sent.ence in the interest of 
justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired. bis probation, or oonditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise 
mtlRWfully held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho Codet that 
the peti:iioner is mnoeent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon 
any ground or alleged etror heretofore available under any eo:i:anmn law, statotory 
ot other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
I.C. i 19--490l(a). 
Petltions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the criminal 
action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanch4$ v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P .2d 642 
(CtApp.1995). "An application for post-conviction relief initiat.es a proceeding which is civil in 
2 
Banca v, State 
Opl:mon & Order on Motion for &mmal:7 Dlm,1ua1 
O.i30 
petition. LC. § 
proof imposed and then prove a 
for Martmezv. 
State. Idaho 844. 846, 875 941 (Ct.App.1994). A petition fur post~nviction relief 
"may be filed at any v.rithin one (1) year from tbe expimtion time or 
Under I.C. § 19-4906, sumrnary disposition a petition post-conviction relief may 
orupon 
the petitioner to 
711. is: also 
to entitle a petitioner to an evidemisry hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 
P.2d 369 (Ct.App.1986). 
3 
II ()l'l:fJav. Slate 
Op!Dion & Order an Motioll for bmar,Y Dimlfsw 
Oi31 
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Petitioner's Second Amended Petition seeks post-conviction relief based on claims of 
ineffective assistance of connsel !rui viol.arlons ofbis 5th, flh. and 14th Amendment rights to a fair 
trial and due process of law. Spooifically, Petitioner contends trial co1D1Bel did not allow him to 
testify in his own defense at trial and trial counsel was ineffective by failing to hire an expert to 
tesify on hi! behalf 
This Court has "adopted the Strick!.and two-prong test to evaluate whether a 
criminal defendant received effective assistance of counsel." Dunlap I11i 141 
Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004) (citing Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687> 104 S.Ct. 20S2, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Mathe1% 133 Idaho 
300i 306, 986 P .2d 323. 329 (1999)). In order to survive a motion for ~
dismissal, post-oonviction relief claims bared upon ineffective assistance of 
counsel must establish "the existence of material issues of met as to whether: (1) 
counsel1s performance WBB deficient, and (2) t1mt deficiency prejudiced appellant's 
case." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P .3d 1277, 1282 (2010) (citing 
Saykhamcho11ei 127 ldaho at 323, 900 P,2d at 799). To prove deficient 
performance, the appellattt "must show the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Dunlap JJl, 141 Idaho at 59t 106 P Jd at 
385 (citing Gilptn--Gruhb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)), To 
demonstrate prejudice, the appellant "must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for the attomey's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different." Id " 'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undennine 
confidence in the outcome.'" Cullen v. Pitihhlster, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 
1388, 1403, 179 L.Bd.2d 551 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). This 
"requires a •substamia!, not just 'conceivable,' likelihood of a different result." Id. 
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct 770, 791) 178 L.Ed.2d 
624 (2011)). 
The appellant must also overcome .. a strong presmnption that trial counsel was 
competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal stta:tegy:' Dwilap l1I, 
141 Idaho at 58-59, 106 P.3d at 384--85 (citing Striddand. 466 U.S. at 689; 
Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306,986 P.2d at 329), "'A fmr assessment of attomey 
performance requires that every effort be made to eifmina the distorting effects 
ofhinds:ight, to reoonstruct the cireumstances of counsers cbaUenged conduct; 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strlcldand, 
466 U.S. at 689. Thus, strategic decisions me "virtually tmcbell,angeable" if made 
after a ~ugh investigation of the law and facts relevant to plaos.ible 
options .... " Id at 690-91, Decisions "made after less than complete investigation" 
are still reasonable to the extem "that reasonable professioml jndgments sapport 
the limitations on investigation." Id. Counsel is permi• to develop a strategy 
4 
0 .i. 32 
court it was 
understood bad the right to testify, but was not required t.o 
court cmares a clear record by askmg a defendant if he consulted 
to 
it is helpful when a 
his attorney and 
decided not to testify, in the mstant matter this Court finds the sentencing trauscrlpt helpful in 
addressing the issue. Prlor to hnposmg sentence, the trial judge askad Petitioner Boncz if he had 
addition to 
his effor!.S to discredit the testimony of 'Witnesses. Boncz inf owed the trial judge of the many 
exrors he believed we.re committed by 
(2) deficiency 
was prevented from doing so of fact as to 
counsel's representation was defl.cient. However, Petitioner failed to meet 
second prong of the Stricldand t.est, wb:ieh is to show the existence of material issues of fact th.at 
he was prer..idiced by not being allowed to wstify, During his statement to the c:otut a1 
sentencing, Petitioner Boncz provided the court with no exculps.tory facts or evidence not 
5 
B(llll;av, State 
Opinicn &. Order on Motlcn :for S1llll1mltY ~ 
Oi33 
,.,.,,-,., ... ~.--- --~-~--·--·--·-~-------- ·--~----"' 
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produced at trial. The same is true of his Petition. as Banez offers the Court no exculpatory facts 
not already presented at trial. 
Petitioner suggests in his Petition that his trial C.OU!lSel :fsile.d to present an elremate 
perpetrator theory to the court, but he offers no facts that support sach a theory nor does the trial 
transcript support Boncz's tbeocy_ There was evidence presented to too oourt that the young 
victim disclosed two separate events. The fim event described by 1he victim involved Petitioner 
BollQ'.. The 5C001ld event she described involved a thwarted attempt by a dmerent individual 
that ooourred several months after the event involving Petiti~ner. The victim was very clear in 
differentiating the nvo events and was olear who the perpetrmoc was in each evem.1 Petitioner 
Boncz has presented no new :mets ftmt bring into doubt the facts presented at trial or that 5Upp0rt 
in any way his theory that im alternate perpetrator defense should have been presented. Rather. 
he merely asserts his trial cout1Sel should have pursued an a1tetmte perpetrator theory despite the 
lack of facts or evidence ia support of such a theory, 
Next, Petitioner Bon.cz asserts bis trla1 counsel WEB ineffective by failing to hire an expert 
to testify in his defense. "Under the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a showing of prejudice requires more 'than mere speculation about whai an expert 
witness may have said if trial counsel employed them. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 
21 P.3d 924,927 (2001) ... S!Jlf v. Stata, 145 Idaho S78, 581, 181 P.3d 504 (Ct.App.2007). 
To justify an evidentiaey hearing in a post-conviction relief proceedio.g, it is 
incumbent on the applicant to tender writte.n ~ements from potential witnesses 
who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge. 
Dro.peauv. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546~ .551 (Ct.App.1982). It is not 
enough to simply allege that an expert should have been secured without 
prcMdhlg, through affidavits~ mde.0ce of the substance oftb.e expert's testimony, 
Hallv. State, 126 Idaho 449,453,885 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Ct.App.1994). Absent an 
affidavit from tb.e expert explainmg what be or she would have t.estified to, or 
1 Trlal Tr. p. 103. 
Bom,a V. Slate 




to trial strategy. 
impeach the testimony of witnesses, and 
inconsistent testimony. Petitioner~ however1 offers no facts that would have allowed bis trial 
was wrongly admitted because bis trial counsel failed to object, and he fails to direct the Court to 
inconsistent stirteme:nts by at Court v.,1th no 
wouldhave different. In the 
matter, a oourt trial was held. 
prove, de.fined reasonable doubt, discussed the inconsistencies in the evidence, made note of the 
limited assistance he received from the expert testimony, and explained the weight that he gave 
7 
Bo11Ct111, SJttts 
Opildon & Order on Motic.m for Sumnulry Dismissal 
l'v l. J. L \: ! J , i , V / ~,m f1V, !JOU I, VJ;· 
- -to the victim's testimony and why.2 Petitioner Boncz offers this Court no new evidence that bas 
a reasonable prohabili:ty of 1mdermtQ-l.ng the outcome of the trial. offers no evidence of any 
specific failure on the part of his trial attomey that has a reasonable probahilitr of obangjng 'the: 
outcome of the trial, and offers the Court no affidavit of an expert regarding testimony that 
would be presented at an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner Boncz has simply failed to offer this 
Court anydrlng more than mere speculation that, but for the alleged ineffective &BSistance of his 
trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 1rial would have been 
d:i:ffercnt. 
ORDER 
The State• s Motion for Sumtrutty Dismissal is hereby GR.A1'11ED. 
1 Tri;;! Tr. pp. 29Q...296. 
,~to.$flllS 
Opini04 & On1er on Motion fur Smmnmy Dimrls.981 
Dated this V day of October 2013. 
s 
Oi3G 
